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Abstract:
Purpose: This paper compares the efficiency of  two revenue-sharing contracts and discusses
the  members’  preference  for  a  three-echelon  supply  chain  with  the  retailer’s  different  risk
attitude. 
Design/methodology/approach: This paper focuses on a three-echelon supply chain with a
manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer. If  the retailer is risk-neutral, the coordination of  the
supply chain based on the two revenue-sharing contracts is comparatively studied. If  the retailer
is  downside-risk-aversion,  the  supply  chain  performance  is  comparatively  analyzed  and  a
risk-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, the two revenue-sharing
contracts under the risk-sharing contract are still compared.
Findings:  Although both the two revenue-sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain
with a risk-neutral  retailer,  they  are  not  always  able  to coordinate  the  supply  chain with  a
risk-averse  retailer.  It  is  interesting  that  the  supply  chain  with  a  risk-averse  retailer  can  be
coordinated  by  executing  a  designed  risk-sharing  contract,  which  is  based  on  any  kind  of
revenue-sharing contract. Finally, any kind of  revenue-sharing contracts is not absolutely better
than another. Based on the risk-sharing contract, the retailer’s preference is equivalent between
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the two contracts; but for the distributor and the manufacturer, their preferences between the
two contracts are positively related to their own profit share in the supply chain.
Originality/value: Comprehensively comparing the two revenue-sharing contracts is the only
presented research in the supply chain.
Keywords: supply chain, three-echelon, revenue-sharing contract, risk-aversion
1. Introduction
Revenue sharing contract is a supply chain contract between a manufacturer and a retailer, in
which the manufacturer charges a low wholesale price to the retailer and shares a fraction of
her revenue. It could induce the retailer to choose optimal actions in the supply chain (quantity
and price)  and also  allocate  channel  profits  among the  supply  chain  members (Cachon &
Lariviere, 2005). It is widely adopted in variety of industries, such as the video rental industry
(Mortimer, 2008), the mobile networks with independent content providers and mobile service
supply  chain  (Lu,  Lin  &  Wang,  2010),  the  assembly  systems  with  vendor–management
inventory (Gerchak & Wang, 2004), semiconductor industry supply chain (Bahinipati, Kanda &
Deshmukh, 2009), airline alliances (Hu, Caldentey & Vulcano, 2013), and dairy supply chain
(Qian, Zhang, Wu & Pan, 2013).
In a multi-echelon supply chain, two revenue sharing contracts can be used. The first one,
proposed by Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo in 2004, is that the revenues are shared by all pairs
of adjacent entities. The second one, proposed by Rhee, Veen, Venugopal and Nalla in 2010, is
that the retailer simultaneously shares her revenues with all supply chain members. We call
the first contract revenue sharing contract I and call the second one revenue sharing contract
II. It is worth noting that Rhee et al. (2010) point that revenue sharing contract I implicitly
assumes that all contracts between the pairs of entities are installed simultaneously, which is
the  key  difficulty  to  implement  the  contract.  However,  with  the  high-speed  developing  of
internet,  the  difficulty  getting smaller,  especially  in  a  three-echelon supply  chain  which  is
composed of less member. 
Managing risk in a supply chain has now been a more popular topic. Essentially, in a supply
chain  context,  if  there  are  some sources  of  uncertainty  such as  demand and supply,  the
performance of the supply chain will also be affected and become uncertain. As a result, risk
emerges and supply chain agents have to make decision under risk. Then we focus on supply
chain coordination with a risk-averse retailer based on two revenue sharing contracts.
Specifically, we focus on a three-echelon supply chain which is composed of a manufacturer, a
distributor  and  a  retailer.  Based  on  the  retailer’s  different  risk  attitude,  we  comparatively
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research supply chain coordination through two revenue sharing contracts. If the retailer is
risk-neutral, the revenue sharing contract I and the revenue sharing contract II are the same
for  the  supply  chain,  because  both  of  them can  maximize  the  total  supply  chain  profit.
Moreover, the performance of the members depends on the particular contract selected and no
contract is absolutely preferred by all agents. If the retailer is risk-averse, her downside-risk is
related to her profit share in the supply chain. And both the two revenue sharing contracts are
not necessarily able to coordinate the supply chain, which is related to the retailer’s degree of
risk aversion. Moreover, any kind of revenue sharing contract is also not absolutely better than
another, which is related to the retailer’s degree of risk averse and the contract parameters.
Then, a modification of risk sharing contract of  Gan, Sethi and Yan (2005) is  analyzed to
coordinate  the  supply  chain  and  satisfy  the  retailer’s  risk  constraint.  The  modification  is
because the retailer’s downside-risk constraint cannot be satisfied if the retailer’s cost is not
zero in Gan et al.  (2005). We have two kinds of risk sharing contracts based on the two
revenue sharing contracts, because the risk sharing contract is a composite contract based on
buyback contract and any kind of revenue sharing contract. Through comparatively analyzing
the two risk sharing contracts, the comparison between the two revenue sharing contracts is
very intuitive.  For  the whole  supply chain and the downside-risk-retailer,  the two revenue
sharing contracts are equivalent. For the manufacturer and the distributor, their preferences
between the two revenue sharing contracts are positively related to their own profit share in
the supply chain.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 introduces two revenue sharing contracts with risk-neutral members and compares
the  two  revenue  sharing  contracts.  Section  4  comparative  analyzes  the  supply  chain
performances with a risk-averse retailer under the different revenue sharing contracts. Then, in
Section  5,  the  improved  contracts  of  the  two  revenue  sharing  contracts  are  proposed  to
coordinate  the  supply  chain  with  a  risk-averse  retailer.  Finally,  conclusion  is  presented  in
Section 6.
2. Literature Review
This  paper  incorporates  three  streams of  research from the  literature.  The relevant  areas
include (1) two-echelon supply chain with revenue sharing contracts, (2) multi-echelon supply
chain  with  revenue  sharing  contracts,  and  (3)  supply  chain  coordination  with  risk-averse
members.
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(1) Two-echelon supply chain with revenue sharing contract
A supply chain consists of several members that usually have different and conflicting
objectives, which need to be coordinated by contracts. Many coordinating contracts,
such as buy-back or return contract, revenue sharing contract, and quantity-flexibility
contract, have been proposed to improve supply chain performance. A comprehensive
review of contracts is presented in Govindan, Popiuc and Diabat (2013). Among the
different kinds of contracts, revenue sharing contract is a popular contract which proved
to be efficient for several industries. For example, revenue sharing contract increased
the video industry’s total profit by an estimated 7% (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005). Dana
and Spier (2001) suggested the use of revenue sharing contract  in  a decentralized
channel with a perfectly competitive downstream market and stochastic demand. They
show that a revenue sharing contract could induce the downstream firms to choose a
channel-optimal  action.  Zhang  and  Chen  (2014)  studied  information  sharing  in  a
make-to-stock supply chain under  wholesale contract  and revenue sharing contract.
They show that information sharing benefits the supplier, the retailer and the supply
chain when revenue sharing contract is used. Hsueh (2014) proposed a new revenue
sharing  contract  embedding  corporate  social  responsibility  to  coordinate  a  two-tier
supply chain.
(2) Multi-echelon supply chains with revenue sharing contract
In reality, supply chain consists of more than two echelons. So the research on the
multi-echelon supply chain is a need. Some researchers focus on the coordination of
multi-echelon supply chains, such as Jaber, Bonney and Guiffrida (2010). The research
has been conducted on the coordination of multi-echelon supply chains with contracts
such as price-only contract, quantity discount contract, buyback contract, and revenue
sharing contract.
We notice  that  two revenue  sharing contracts  can be  used in  multi-echelon supply
chain. The first one is that the revenues are shared by all pairs of adjacent entities,
proposed  by  Giannoccaro  and  Pontrandolfo  (2004),  and  is  extended  to  study  a
three-echelon supply chain with surplus goods and credit  losing by Ji,  Liu and Han
(2007). Then, it is expanded to study a three-echelon supply chain with the retailer’s
sales effort by Pang, Chen and Hu (2014). Moreover, the second one is that the retailer
simultaneously shares her revenues with all supply chain members, proposed by Rhee
et  al.  (2010),  and  is  extended  to  study  an  N-stage  supply  chain  with  reliability
considerations by Feng, Moon and Ryu (2014). Rhee et al. (2010) pointed out that the
contract of Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004) has a key difficulty to implement, i.e.,
the  contract  implicitly  assumes  that  all  contracts  between  the  pairs  of  entities  are
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installed simultaneously. Jiang, Wang, Yan and Dai (2014) showed that the contract of
Giannoccaro  and  Pontrandolfo  (2004)  may  never  be  established  in  a  three-echelon
supply chain with competing manufacturers, where the members in the supply chain
make decision sequentially. However, with the high-speed developing of internet, it is
easily  implemented  that  all  contracts  between  the  pairs  of  entities  are  installed
simultaneously  in  a  three-echelon  supply  chain.  Jiang  et  al.  (2014)  focused  on  a
three-echelon supply  chain  with  the  two revenue  sharing contracts.  But  they don’t
analyze the member’s risk attitude in the supply chain.
(3) Supply chain coordination with risk-averse member
Modeling risk-averse newsvendor problem has received considerable attention in recent
years.  Utility functions, mean-variance approach, value-at-risk (VaR) and conditional
value-at-risk (CVaR) are four main research streams. We focus on the VaR approach,
which is a financial risk measure that has emerged and been widely used in recent
years. A distinct disadvantage of the standard VaR criterion is that it purely considers
risk  but  not  the  expected  profits.  Although  many  supply  chain  members  may  be
risk-averse, they still seek to attain a high (expected) profit. To reflect this, VaR can be
used as a constraint, e.g., with a probability of 95% the realized profit is at least some
fixed amount (Gan et al., 2005).
Gan, Sethi,  and Yan (2004) first consider a supply chain coordination problem with
risk-averse agent. According to Gan et al. (2004), we know that
‘A contract  coordinates a supply chain if  under the contract,  (1) the agents’
reservation  payoff  constraints  are  satisfied,  and  (2)  the  agents’  joint  action
under this contract is Pareto-optimal.’
In a companion paper (Gan et al., 2005), the definition of coordination was specialized
for  a  supply  chain  with  a  risk-neutral  supplier  and  a  downside-risk  constrained
newsvendor. 
To coordinate a supply chain with risk-averse members, some well-known contracts have
been considered such as return policy,  profit  sharing contract,  the target  sales rebate
contract and real option contract. Moreover, some new contracts have proposed to improve
supply chain performance and achieve supply chain coordination, such as gain/loss sharing
contract,  advanced-purchase  discount  contract,  buyback-setup-cost-sharing mechanism
and risk sharing contract. In multi-echelon supply chain, Agrawal and Seshadri (2000)
introduced  risk-neutral  intermediaries  to  offer  mutually  beneficial  contracts  to
risk-averse retailers, and they demonstrated that an important role of an intermediary
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in distribution channels is to reduce the risk faced by retailers; Xu, Meng and Shen
(2013)  proposed  a  tri-level  programming  model  for  a  three-stage  supply  chain
management  based  on  Conditional  Value-at-Risk  measure,  to  improve  the  risk
management of the supply chain. However, the two papers above did not consider the
supply  chain  coordination.  Gan  et  al.  (2005)  proposed  a  risk  sharing  contract  to
coordinate the supply chain with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. The
risk sharing contract is composed of buyback contract and revenue sharing contract,
and its basic idea is to provide downside protection to the retailer by refunding a certain
amount  of  unsold  units.  However,  if  the  retailer’s  cost  is  not  zero,  the  retailer’s
downside-risk constraint cannot be met by executing this risk sharing contract. So we
improve the risk sharing contract in a three-echelon supply chain to satisfy the retailer’s
risk constraint and coordinate the supply chain.
3. Two Revenue Sharing Contracts in the Supply Chain with a Risk-neutral Retailer
In this section, we focus on a one-period supply chain model, which has a manufacturer (M), a
distributor (D) and a retailer (R). The material, information, and financial flow are specified as
plotting in Figure 1. There is just one kind of product selling in one-period. The lead-times of the
order from both the retailer and the distributor are zero. Each member has an infinite capacity.
The demand in one period, denoted by X, is stochastic random with the distribution function F(·)
and the density function f(·). The unsatisfied demand in the end of the period is lost. 
Figure 1. The three-echelon supply chain
In the supply chain, the following events will happen sequentially in one selling period: (1) at
the beginning of the selling period, the manufacturer produces the product at the cost cM per
unit and the manufacturer announces the wholesale price w2 per unit; (2) after observing the
wholesale price from the manufacture, the distributor announces the wholesale price, denoted
by w1 per unit; (3) the retailer makes order from the distributor and the order quantity is Q;
(4) the distributor makes the same order as the retailer from the manufacturer and delivers
products to the retailer immediately, her transferring cost for per unit of product is cD; (5) the
retailer  has hold cost  cR per unit  for  the arrived products.  Economically,  any supply chain
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member’s pricing is greater than her cost. So three inequalities hold such as  w1 + cR < p,
cD + w2 < w1 and cM < w2.
In fact, there are only two revenue sharing contracts in the three-echelon supply chain. The
revenue  sharing  contract  I,  introduced  in  Section  3.1,  was  proposed  by  Giannoccaro  and
Pontrandolfo (2004) to coordinate a three-echelon supply chain. Moreover, the monitoring and
controlling  quality  of  the  multi-echelon  supply  chain  is  very  important  such  as  food
multi-echelon supply chain. The revenue sharing contract II, introduced in Section 3.2, is a
good contract to monitor and control quality in the multi-echelon supply chain.
3.1. The Revenue Sharing Contract I with a Risk-neutral Retailer
The revenue sharing contract I (denoted by superscript I)   in the three-echelon
supply chain is shown in Figure 2. At the end of selling period, the retailer gives   of her
revenue to the distributor and the distributor gives   of her revenue to the manufacturer
, where  and  represent the members’ bargaining power in the supply chain. If
the manufacturer’s bargaining power is  stronger,   is  large; if  the distributor’s bargaining
power is stronger,  is large and  is small; and if the retailer’s bargaining power is stronger,
 is small.
In the supply chain with the revenue sharing contract I, the expected profits of the retailer, the
distributor and the manufacturer are as follows:
(1)
(2)
and
(3)
The total expected profit of the supply chain is the sum of all the supply chain members’ profit,
i.e.,
(4)
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Figure 2. The three-echelon supply chain with the revenue sharing contract I
In the centralized supply chain, the total expected profit of  the supply chain  is concave with
respect to Q. So the retailer has the unique positive and optimal order quantity QC, i.e.,
(5)
Combining Equations (4) and (5), the optimal total expected profit of the supply chain is
(6)
According  to  Giannoccaro  and  Pontrandolfo  (2004),  for  any  given   and  ,  the  revenue
sharing contract I with parameters
(7a)
(7b)
coordinates the supply chain. With the coordinated revenue sharing contract I, the optimal
profits of the three members are, respectively,
(8a)
(8b)
And
(8c)
In  the  coordinated  supply  chain  with  revenue  sharing  contract  I,  the  members’  profit
allocations are determined by  and . Specifically, the retailer’s profit share is  , the
distributor’s profit share is  and the manufacturer’s profit share is . Thus, the
revenue  sharing  contract  I  not  only  coordinates  the  three-echelon  supply  chain  but  also
arbitrarily allocates the profit among the members. If the retailer’s bargaining power becomes
stronger, the retailer would expect the decreasing of  ; if the distributor’s bargaining power
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becomes stronger, the distributor would expect the increasing of  and the decreasing of ;
and if the manufacturer’s bargaining power becomes stronger, the manufacturer would expect
the increasing of both   and  . It indicates that conflicts of interest exist among the three
members.
Furthermore,  the  wholesale  price   is  negative  if   and   is  negative  if
. Therefore, if the manufacturer (the distributor) has a strong bargaining power,
the manufacturer (the distributor) may set a negative wholesale price to the distributor (the
retailer).  This  can  be  regarded  as  a  principle-agent  chain  that  the  manufacturer  (the
distributor) entrusts the distributor (the retailer) to sell products through spending a certain
cost. And the manufacturer (the distributor) gets a higher rebate from the distributor (the
retailer) at the end of the selling period. Such a situation occurs in a commercial practice, i.e. a
regular chain.
3.2. The Revenue Sharing Contract II with a Risk-neutral Retailer
The revenue sharing contract II (denoted by superscript II)  in the three-echelon
supply chain is shown in Figure 3. At the  end of selling period,  the retailer gives   of her
revenue  to  the  distributor,  and  gives   of  her  revenue  to  the  manufacturer,  where
. In the revenue sharing contract II,  and  represent the members’ bargaining
power in the supply chain. If the manufacturer’s bargaining power is stronger,  is large; if the
distributor’s bargaining power is stronger,  is large; and if the retailer’s bargaining power is
stronger, both  and  are small.
Figure 3. The three-echelon supply chain with the revenue sharing contract II
In the supply chain with the revenue sharing contract II, the expected profits of the retailer,
the distributor and the manufacturer are as follows:
(9)
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(10)
and
(11)
Combining Equations (9), (10) and (11), the total expected profit of  the supply chain is still
 (See Equation (4)). So in the centralized supply chain, the optimal order quantity of
the retailer is QC and the optimal total expected profit of the supply chain is .
According to Van der Rhee et al. (2010), for any given  and , the revenue sharing contract
II with parameters
(12a)
(12b)
coordinates the supply chain. With the coordinated contract II, the optimal profits of the three
supply chain members are, respectively,
(13a)
(13b)
and
(13c)
In the coordinated supply chain with revenue sharing contract II, the retailer’s profit share is
, the distributor’s profit share is  and the manufacturer’s profit share is . Thus,
the  revenue  sharing  contract  II  not  only  coordinates  the  supply  chain  but  also  arbitrarily
allocates  the  supply  chain  profit  among  the  members.  If  the  retailer’s  bargaining  power
becomes  stronger,  the  retailer  would  expect  the  decreasing  of  both   and  ;  if  the
distributor’s bargaining power becomes stronger, the distributor would expect the increasing of
; and if  the manufacturer’s bargaining power becomes stronger, the manufacturer would
expect the increasing of . Thus, conflicts of interest exist among the three members in the
supply chain.
Furthermore, the wholesale price   is negative if   and  is negative if
. Specifically, if   and  , both   and  
are negative. That means that the manufacturer is  a core enterprise in  the three-echelon
supply chain, she entrusts the retailer to sell the products and the distributor to distribute the
products.
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3.3. Compare the Coordinated Results between the Two Revenue Sharing Contracts
According to the above subsections, both of the revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the
three-echelon supply chain with coordinated parameters. However, the supply chain members’
optimal profits are changed in the different revenue sharing contracts. For the supply chain,
the  problem  is  which  contract  will  be  preferred.  We  will  focus  on  this  problem  in  this
subsection.
For the supply chain, the revenue sharing contract I and the revenue sharing contract II are
the same because both of them can maximize the total supply chain profit. For each member
of the supply chain, we compare their optimal profit in the revenue sharing contract I with that
in the revenue sharing contract II, respectively. The comparative results are given in Table 1.
In Table 1, the parameters  ,  ,   and   value in thirteen different areas, so there are
thirteen different comparative results accordingly. According to the comparative results, we
have the proposition as follows.
Proposition 1. If  and , the revenue sharing contract I is the same
as the revenue sharing contract II. Otherwise, any kind of revenue sharing contracts is not
absolutely better than another.
Proposition 1 can be obtained by observing Table 1, so we omit the proof.
According  to  Proposition  1,  the  members’  preferences  between  the  two  revenue  sharing
contracts  depend on the  parameters  ,  ,   and  .  Furthermore,  under  the  conditions
(1)-(12) in  Table  1,  the members cannot reach a  consensus  preference.  Therefore,  which
contract is employed in the supply chain is determined by the choice of the core enterprise. For
example,  if  the  retailer  is  the  core  enterprise,  she  has  the  ability  to  persuade  the  other
members to choice the revenue sharing contract II under the condition (1). In this case, the
retailer should give the distributor and the manufacturer some subsidies to make up their loss
in the revenue sharing contract II.
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                                                Item
                            Contrast
 Conditión
Compare
 with 
Compare
 with 
Compare
 with 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
Table 1. Comparisons  with ,  with  and  with 
4. Two Revenue Sharing Contracts in the Supply Chain with a Risk-averse Retailer
In some supply chains with smaller retailer, both  the manufacturer and the distributor can
transfer their risk downside and the smaller retailer prefers to risk-averse. In this kind of case
can the revenue sharing contracts still coordinate the three-echelon supply chain? Based on
the question, the performance of the supply chain with a risk-averse retailer is focused on the
rest of the paper. Furthermore, the comparative analysis of the supply chain performances with
different revenue sharing contract is conducted.
The downside risk measure is the probability that the return is below a target level. Its pioneering
definition was introduced by Fishburn (1977) and was reset by Gan et al. (2005) in a newsvendor
model. According to Gan et al. (2005), letting αR be the target profit of the risk-averse retailer, for
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any given order quantity Q and random demand realized value X, the retailer’s downside risk is the
probability that her profit is not greater than αR, i.e., P{πR(Q, X)≤ αR)}. Hence for any given target
profit level αR and upper bound of the downside risk βR(0<βR<1), the risk-averse retailer makes an
order quantity Qj*(j=I or II) to maximize her expected profit, while her profit doesn’t fall below her
target  profit  level  αR and  the  downside  risk  doesn’t  exceed  a  specified  βR(0<βR<1).  The
downside-risk-averse retailer’s decision problem is
(14a)
(14b)
The  retailer’s  extent  of  risk-aversion  is  measured  by  risk-aversion  pair  (αR,βR). For  two
risk-aversion pairs   and  , if   and  , then the second pair means a
higher aversion to risk than does the first. Hence, the pair (αR,βR) can be called the retailer’s
risk-averse level.
4.1. The Revenue Sharing Contract I with a Risk-averse Retailer
In the three-echelon supply chain with the revenue sharing contract I, the risk-averse retailer’s
optimal order quantity and the retailer’s  downside risk are discussed, which the wholesale
prices  and  in the revenue sharing contract I are given by Equations (7a) and (7b).
Proposition 2. For any given target profit level αR, the risk-averse retailer has a critical order
quantity
(15)
For the critical order quantity QI0 the retailer’s downside risk is
(16)
Furthermore, if Q>QI0, the retailer’s downside risk increases with respect to Q.
Proposition 2 is similar  to Proposition 2.1 in  Gan et al.  (2005). Furthermore, according to
Proposition 2, the upper bound and lower bound of the optimal order quantity QI* are QC and
QI0, respectively, given by Lemma 1.
-1440-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1556
Lemma 1. QI0<QI*≤QC. 
With the upper and lower bound in hands, the retailer’s optimal order quantity QI* is given by
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. For any given risk-aversion level (αR,βR), the retailer’s optimal order quantity is
(17)
where .
The Proposition 3 indicates that if QC satisfies the downside risk constraint (14b), then the
retailer’s  optimal  order  quantity  QI* is  QC exactly.  Moreover,  if  F(QI0)<βR<F(γI),  then  the
retailer’s  optimal  order  quantity  QI* is  defined by  the  formula  ;  and if
βR≤F(QI0), the risk-averse retailer would not order product.
Then we have the following theorem based on the definition of the supply chain coordination
given by Cachon (2003).
Theorem 1. For any given risk-aversion level (αR,βR), if  F(γI)≤βR, the three-echelon supply
chain can be coordinated by the revenue sharing contract I with the wholesale prices ( , );
and if βR<F(γI), the three-echelon supply chain cannot be coordinated by the revenue sharing
contract I.
According to Proposition 3, the members’ optimal expected profits can be derived. The optimal
expected profit of member i (i=R, D or M) and the total profit of the supply chain are 
and , respectively.
Proposition 4. For any given risk-aversion level (αR,βR),
(1) if F(γI)≤βR, the optimal expected profits of the supply chain member i are equal to  (i=R,
D or M), respectively, which are given by Equations (8a)-(8c);
(2) if F(QI0)<βR<F(γI), then the optimal expected profits of the retailer, the distributor and the
manufacturer are
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(18a)
(18b)
and
(18c)
respectively. Furthermore, , ,  and ;
(3) if βR≤F(QI0), all the members’ optimal expected profits are zero.
According to Proposition 4, the members do not change their profit shares in the supply chain
with the revenue sharing contract I even if the retailer’s risk attitude has changed. This is
because the retailer’s risk attitude cannot affect the members' bargaining powers. Moreover, if
F(QI0)<βR<F(γI),  all  the  members’  optimal  expected  profits  in  the  supply  chain  with  the
risk-averse retailer are less than that in the supply chain with the risk-neutral retailer, and the
retailer’s optimal decision cannot maximize the total expected profit of the supply chain by
executing the revenue sharing contract I. The reason is that the retailer does not want to bear
high risk and makes a low order quantity such that QI*<QC.
4.2. The Revenue Sharing Contract II with a Risk-averse Retailer
Similar  to  the  subsection  4.1,  based  on the  revenue  sharing  contract  II,  we  analyze  the
performance of the supply chain with the risk-averse retailer, which the wholesale prices  
and  in the revenue sharing contract II are given by Equations (12a) and (12b). 
Proposition 5. For any given target profit level αR, the risk-averse retailer has a critical order
quantity
(19)
For the critical order quantity QII0 , the retailer’s downside risk is
(20)
Furthermore, if Q>QII0, then the retailer’s downside risk increases with respect to Q.
Similar to Lemma 1, the upper bound and lower bound of the retailer’s optimal order quantity
QII*, are QC and QII0, respectively.
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Lemma 2. QII0<QII*≤QC.
With the upper and lower bound in hands, we can derive the retailer’s optimal order quantity. 
Proposition 6. For any given risk-aversion level (αR,βR), the retailer’s optimal order quantity is
given by
(21)
where .
Proposition 6 indicates that if  F(γII)≤βR, the risk-neutral retailer’s optimal order quantity  QC
satisfies  the  downside  risk  constraint  (14b),  hence  the  risk-averse  retailer’s  optimal  order
quantity is  exactly  QC.  Moreover, if  F(QII0)<βR<F(γII),  then the risk-averse retailer’s  optimal
order quantity QII* is defined by the formula ; and if βR≤F(QII0), then the
risk-averse retailer would not order any product.
Similar to Theorem 1, we have the following results.
Theorem 2. For any given risk-aversion level (αR,βR), if  F(γII)≤βR, the three-echelon supply
chain can be coordinated by the revenue sharing contract II with ( ,  ); if  F(γII)>βR, the
three-echelon supply chain cannot be coordinated by the revenue sharing contract II.
The optimal expected profit of member i (i=R, D or M) and the total profit of the supply chain
are denoted by  and . We have the similar results as Proposition 4 given in
Proposition 7. 
Proposition 7. For any given risk-aversion level (αR,βR),
(1) if  F(γII)≤βR,  the optimal  profits  of  the retailer,  the distributor and the manufacturer in
supply chain with risk-averse retailer are Equations (13a), (13b) and (13c), respectively;
(2) if F(QII0)<βR<F(γII), the optimal profits of the retailer, the distributor and the manufacturer
are
(22a)
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(22b)
and
(22c)
respectively. Furthermore, , ,  and ;
(3) if F(QII0)≥βR, all the members’ optimal expected profits are zero.
According to Proposition 7, the retailer’s profit  share is  ,  the distributor’s profit
share is  and the manufacturer’s profit share is . So even if the retailer’s risk attitude has
changed,  the members’  profit  shares are no change in the supply chain with the revenue
sharing contract II. Moreover, if F(QII0)<βR<F(γII), any member’s optimal expected profit in the
supply  chain  with  the  risk-averse  retailer  is  less  than  that  in  the  supply  chain  with  the
risk-neutral retailer,  and the retailer’s optimal decision cannot maximize the total  expected
profit of the supply chain by executing the revenue sharing contract II.
4.3.  Compare  the  Supply  Chain  Performance  between  the  Two  Revenue  Sharing
Contracts
We analyze the differences between the two revenue sharing contracts on the performance of
the  supply  chain.  The  comparative  analysis  is  discussed  in  three  aspects,  the  retailers’
downside-risk, the retailer’s optimal order quantity and the members’ expected profits.
4.3.1. Comparative Analysis on the Retailer’s Downside-risk
Lemma 3
If , then QI0>QII0 and F(QI0)>F(QII0);
if , then QI0=QII0 and F(QI0)=F(QII0); and
if , then QI0<QII0 and F(QI0)<F(QII0).
Lemma 3 can be obtained by observing Equations (15) and (19), so we omit the proof.
For any given βR, let  and . With Lemma 3 in hand and
refer to Figure 1 in Gan et al. (2005), if , we draw Figure 4; if , we draw
Figure 5. According to Figure 4 and Figure 5, we get Proposition 8. 
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Proposition 8
(1) The retailer’s downside-risk increases with the order quantity Q in the two revenue sharing
contracts if Q>QI0 and Q>QII0. 
(2) If  , the retailer’s downside-risks in the two revenue sharing contracts are the
same; 
if , the retailer’s downside-risk in the revenue sharing contract I is not smaller than
that in the revenue sharing contract II; and
if , the retailer’s downside-risk in the revenue sharing contract I is not greater than
that in the revenue sharing contract II.
According to Proposition 8, the retailer’s downside-risk is related to her profit share in the
supply chain based on any kind of revenue sharing contract.
Figure 4. The retailer’s downside-risks when 
Figure 5. The retailer’s downside-risks when 
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4.3.2. Comparative Analysis on the Retailer’s Optimal Order
Equations (17) and (21), and Figures 4 and 5 indicate that there is an order relation between
the retailer’s optimal order quantities in different models. Hence, according to Lemma 3, we
have results as follows.
Proposition 9
(1) For , then QI*=QII*. 
(2) For , if F(QII0)<βR<F(γI), then QI*<QII*; if F(γI)≤βR , then QI*=QII*=QC. 
(3) For , if F(QI0)<βR<F(γII), then QI*>QII*; if F(γII)≤βR , then QI*=QII*=QC.
According to Proposition 9, the retailer’s optimal order quantity is confined by her risk aversion
level (αR,βR) as well as the contract parameters ,  and  in the supply chain. Therefore, if
the retailer’s profit share is the same (Proposition 9(1)), the supply chain gets the same profit
in the two contracts. Besides that, with different revenue sharing contracts, the total profit of
the supply chain is different. We have the corollaries as follows.
Corollary 1. For the whole supply chain, the two revenue sharing contracts are equivalent if
(1) ; or if
(2)  and F(γI)≤βR; or if
(3)  and F(γII)≤βR.
Corollary 2.  For the whole supply chain, the revenue sharing contract I is superior to the
revenue sharing contract II if  and F(QI0)<βR<F(γII).
Corollary 3.  For the whole supply chain, the revenue sharing contract II is superior to the
revenue sharing contract I if  and F(QII0)<βR<F(γI).
According to Corollaries 1-3, for the whole supply chain, the efficiency of the two revenue
sharing contracts is different, which is related to the retailer’s profit share and the upper bound
of the retailer’s downside risk.
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4.3.3. Comparative Analysis on the Members’ Expected Profits
Similar to the analyses on the retailer’s order quantity, we discuss the members’ expected
profits in the two revenue sharing contracts.
Proposition 10. For the retailer, the distributor and the manufacturer, comparative results of
their optimal expected profit under the two revenue sharing contracts are shown in Table 2,
Table 3 and Table 4, respectively.
According to Proposition 10, we get three corollaries as follows.
Corollary 4. For all the members, the two revenue sharing contracts are equivalent if 
(1)  and βR≤F(QI0); or if
(2)  and F(γI)≤βR; or if 
(3)  and F(γI)≤βR; or if
(4)  and F(γII)≤βR.
Corollary 5.  For all the members, the revenue sharing contract I is superior to the revenue
sharing contract II if
(1)  and F(QI0)<βR≤F(QII0); or if
(2)  and F(QII0)<βR<F(γII) and  and 
or if
(3)  and F(QII0)<βR<F(γII) and  and .
Corollary 6. For all the members, the revenue sharing contract II is superior to the revenue
sharing contract I if
(1)  and F(QII0)<βR≤F(QI0); or if
(2)  and F(QI0)<βR<F(γI) and  and ;
or if
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(3)  and F(QI0)<βR<F(γI) and  and .
According  to  corollaries  4-6,  for  all  the  supply  chain  members,  the  efficiency  of  the  two
revenue sharing contracts is also different, which is related to each member’s profit share, the
retailer’s target profit level, and the upper bound of the retailer’s downside risk.
Constraint conditions Comparative results
F(QII0)<βR<F(γI)
F(γI)≤βR
F(QI0)<βR<F(γII)
F(γII)≤βR
Table 2. Comparisons  with 
Constraint conditions Comparative results
βR≤F(QI0)
F(QI0)<βR<F(γI)
F(γI)≤βR
F(QII0)<βR≤F(QI0)
F(QI0)<βR<F(γI)
Uncertainty
F(γI)≤βR
F(QI0)<βR≤F(QII0)
F(QII0)<βR<F(γII)
Uncertainty
F(γII)≤βR
Table 3. Comparisons  with 
-1448-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1556
Constraint conditions Comparative results
βR≤F(QI0)
F(QI0)<βR<F(γI)
F(γI)≤βR
F(QII0)<βR≤F(QI0)
F(QI0)<βR<F(γI)
Uncertainty
F(γI)≤βR
F(QI0)<βR≤F(QII0)
F(QII0)<βR<F(γII)
Uncertainty
F(γII)≤βR
Table 4. Comparisons  with 
5. The Improved Contracts of the Two Revenue Sharing Contracts in the Supply Chain
with a Risk-averse Retailer
According to  Theorem 1 and Theorem 2,  both  the two revenue sharing contracts  are  not
necessarily  able  to  coordinate  the  supply  chain  with  a  risk-averse  retailer.  Hence,  in  this
section, we will improve the two revenue sharing contracts to coordinate the supply chain and
continue to compare the two contracts.
In the three-echelon supply chain with the revenue sharing contract j(j=I, II), the retailer’s
downside risk and her expected profit increase with the order quantity Q when  Qj*<Q≤QC.
Here, the supply chain coordinates if  the retailer ignores the risk constraint and makes an
order such that Q=QC. However, the retailer would make an order Qj* less than QC to avoid the
risk. Hence, to enhance the performance of the supply chain, both the manufacturer and the
distributor would stimulate the risk-averse retailer to increase her ordering quantity from Qj*
up to QC by providing the required downside protection to the retailer. The downside protection
will be provided in the form of buyback for the unsold products.
The stimulation is a modification of risk sharing contract of  Gan et al. (2005). In  Gan et al.
(2005) (the  symbols  in  Gan  et  al.  (2005) continue  to  be  used  in  the  analysis  of  this
paragraph), the retailer would not order a quantity q which q<q* or <q. Moreover, if q*≤q≤ ,
then the retailer’s profit trajectory is
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and the retailer’s downside-risk constraint is  met, where the retailer’s  procurement cost is
assumed to be zero (A detailed description referred to Gan et al. (2005)). If the retailer’s unit
procurement cost CR is not zero (CR>0), then the retailer’s profit trajectory becomes
and if X≤q*, we have
This result indicates that the retailer’s downside-risk constraint cannot be met. So the retailer
also would not order a quantity q such that q*≤q≤ . It means that no trading happens in the
supply chain with the risk sharing contract in Gan et al. (2005).
According to the above description, the risk sharing contract j(j=I, II) is modified to make
downside protection for the retailer and coordinate the supply chain. Here, the risk sharing
contract j is an improved contract of the revenue sharing contract j, so the revenue sharing
contract j is called the initial contract of the risk sharing contract j.
The risk sharing contract j is defined as follows and its basic structure is given in Figure 6:
(i) If the retailer’s order quantity Q is less than or equal to Qj*, the initial contract is executed.
(ii) If the retailer’s order quantity Q is greater than Qj* but not greater than QC, then in addition
to  execute  the  initial  contract,  the  retailer  receives  a  refund  (denoted  by   )  from the
distributor for each unsold unit product in excess of Qj*, and the distributor receives a refund
(denoted by ) from the manufacturer for each unit of return product.
(iii) If the retailer’s order quantity Q is greater than QC, the terms of the contract are the same
as that in (ii) except that the refundable unsold product are not exceed (QC–Qj*).
To investigate the coordination of the three-echelon supply chain with the risk sharing contract,
we adopt the definition of coordination proposed by Gan et al. (2005).
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Definition 1. (Gan et al., 2005 ). The supply chain is coordinated if the following conditions
are satisfied:
(1) all the members get payoffs not less than their respective reservation payoffs,
(2) the retailer’s downside risk constraint is met, and
(3) the supply chain’s expected profit is maximized.
Figure 6. The basic structure of the risk sharing contract
In this paper the reservation payoff of member i is  (i=R, D, M; j=I, II), which is the
member i′s optimal expected profit in the supply chain with the risk-averse retailer under the
revenue-sharing contract j. 
5.1. The Risk Sharing Contract I with a Risk-averse Retailer
In the risk sharing contract I, the refund parameters,  and , will be discussed first. If they
satisfy  and , the retailer and the distributor gain profit from the unsold
products. This inspires the retailer to magnify the demand and results in a heavy bullwhip
effect.  Thus, it  is  reasonable that  the refund parameters are limited to   and
, i.e.,
(23a)
and
(23b)
respectively.
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For any given risk-aversion level (αR,βR), if F(γI)≤βR, the revenue sharing contract I with  and
 has been able to coordinate the supply chain; and if βR<F(QI0), the retailer never orders to
avoid the risk. So we analyze the member i’s profit trajectory  (i=M, D, R) in the risk
sharing contract I only when F(QI0)<βR<F(γI). 
If the retailer’s order satisfies  Q≤QI*, the member i′s expected profit is no greater than her
reservation  profit,  i.e.,  .  This  leads  all  the  members  do  not  want  to
participate in the risk sharing contract I.
If the retailer’s order satisfies Q>QC, the retailer’s profit trajectory is
(24)
where
According to Equations (7a) and (24), we have
Therefore,  the retailer’s  downside-risk constraint  cannot be met.  In this  case,  the retailer
would not order any quantity Q such that Q>QC.
Next, if  the retailer’s order satisfies  QI*<Q≤QC,  the member’s profit  trajectory is  analyzed.
First, the retailer’s profit trajectory is
We  have   if  and  only  if  .  So  the
retailer’s  downside-risk  constraint  is  met  if  ,  i.e.,  .
Combining the range of  in Equation (23a), we have
(25)
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Second, the distributor’s profit trajectory is
and the manufacturer’s profit trajectory is
Then, according to Equations (7a), (7b) and (25), the expected profits of the retailer,  the
distributor and the manufacturer are
(26a)
(26b)
and
(26c)
respectively.
Thus, we obtain a lower bound and an upper bound of  in the following proposition. 
Proposition 11. If the risk-aversion level (αR,βR) satisfies F(QI0)<βR<F(γI), to encourage all the
members to participate into the risk sharing contract I, the refund parameter   is given by
, and the lower bound and the upper bound of the refund parameter 
are
and
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respectively, where QI*<Q≤QC.
If  and , the retailer’s downside-risk constraint is met and all
the  members would  participate  into  the risk  sharing contract  I,  where the retailer’s  order
quantity satisfies QI*<Q≤QC. Hence, according to Definition 1, we get the theorem as follows.
Theorem 3. The risk sharing contract I coordinates the supply chain if the risk-aversion level
(αR,βR) satisfies F(QI0)<βR<F(γI) and the refund parameters satisfy  and
.
According to Theorem 3, if  and , the retailer would order QC
such that the supply chain coordinates. So the optimal expected profits of the retailer, the
distributor and the manufacturer in the risk sharing contract I are,
(27a)
(27b)
and
(27c)
respectively.
5.2. The Risk Sharing Contract II with a Risk-averse Retailer
Similar to the subsection 5.1, the refund parameters,  and , will be discussed first. To avoid
a heavy bullwhip effect, we have
(28a)
and
(28b)
For any given risk-aversion level (αR,βR), we study the member i’s profit trajectory  
(i=R, D, M) only if F(QII0)<βR<F(γII) to avoid two insignificant cases. First, the supply chain has
been coordinated by executing the revenue sharing contract II with  and  if F(γII)≤βR; and
second, the retailer never orders to avoid the risk if βR<F(QII0). 
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If the retailer’s order satisfies Q≤QII*, we have . All the members do not
want to participate in the risk sharing contract II.
If the retailer’s order satisfies Q>QC, the retailer’s profit trajectory is
(29)
where . According to Equations (12a) and (29), we have
Hence, the retailer’s downside-risk constraint cannot be met, and she would not order any
quantity Q such that Q>QC.
Next, if the retailer’s order satisfies QII*<Q≤QC, the retailer’s profit trajectory is
Similar to the discuss in the risk sharing contract I, the retailer’s downside-risk constraint is
met if
(30)
The distributor’s profit trajectory is
The manufacturer’s profit trajectory is
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According  to  Equations  (12a),  (12b)  and  (30),  the  expected  profits  of  the  retailer,  the
distributor and the manufacturer are
(31a)
(31b)
and
(31c)
respectively.
Thus, we get a lower bound and an upper bound for  in the following proposition. 
Proposition 12. If the risk-aversion level (αR,βR) satisfies  F(QII0)<βR<F(γII), to encourage all
the members to participate into the risk sharing contract II, the refund parameter  is given
by  , and the lower bound and the upper bound of the refund
parameter  are
and
respectively, where QII*≤Q≤QC.
If   and  satisfy the conditions in Proposition 12, the retailer’s downside-risk constraint is
met and all the members would participate into the risk sharing contract II if the retailer’s
order satisfies QII*<Q≤QC. Furthermore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.  The risk sharing contract II coordinates the supply chain if the risk-aversion
level (αR,βR) satisfies  F(QII0)<βR<F(γII) and  the  refund  parameters  satisfy
 and .
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According to Theorem 4, if   and  , the retailer would
order  QC such that the supply chain coordinates. So the optimal profits of the retailer, the
distributor and the manufacturer in the risk sharing contract II are
(32a)
(32b)
and
(32c)
respectively.
5.3. Compare the Coordinated Results between the Two Risk Sharing Contracts
For the whole supply chain, the two risk sharing contracts are equivalent if the risk-aversion
level (αR,βR) satisfies F(QI0)<βR<F(γI) and F(QII0)<βR<F(γII), because both of the contracts are
not only able to coordinate the supply chain, but also to meet the retailer’s  downside-risk
constraint.
For the each member, her optimal expected profit is different between the two risk sharing
contracts. In order to clearly distinguish the two revenue sharing contracts, the refunds in the
two  risk  sharing  contracts  should  be  the  same,  i.e.,   and  .  Thus  the  refund
parameter  (j=I or II) is
(33)
And the lower bound and the upper bound of the refund parameter  (j=I or II) become
and
respectively.
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If  and , the comparative analysis of the two risk sharing contracts can represent
that  of  the two revenue sharing contracts.  According to  Equation (33),   holds,
furthermore QI*=QII* holds. Then we get the following proposition.
Proposition 13. If  the risk-aversion level (αR,βR) satisfies  F(Qj0)<βR<F(γj), the comparative
results of the two revenue sharing contracts are shown in Table 5, where  satisfies Equation
(33) and  (j=I or II).
According to Proposition 13, the comparison between the two revenue sharing contracts is very
intuitive through executing the designed risk sharing contract. The conditions (1), (2), (3) in
Table 5 are the conditions (4), (10) and (13) in Table 1, respectively. Moreover, Table 5 is also
a small part of Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4.
                                                Item
                            Results
 Conditión
Compare
 with 
Compare
 with 
Compare
 with 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Table 5. Comparisons  with ,  with  and  with  if  and 
From Table 5, the retailer’s preference is the same between the two revenue sharing contracts.
But for the distributor and the manufacturer, their preferences between the two contracts are
different. The distributor prefers the revenue sharing contract I (II) if her profit share in the
revenue sharing contract  I  (II) is  higher than that  in  the revenue sharing contract II  (I).
Moreover, the manufacturer’s preference is also positively related to her profit share in the
supply chain. Therefore, we have a corollary as follows.
Corollary 7. Based on the risk sharing contracts and , 
(1)  if  ,  all  the  member  gets  the  same profit  between  the  two revenue  sharing
contracts; and
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(2) if , the retailer gets the same profit between the two revenue sharing contracts,
and the distributor’s preference between the two revenue sharing contracts are opposite to the
manufacturer’s.
6. Conclusion
We have analyzed two revenue sharing contracts for a three-echelon supply chain with the
retailer’s different risk attitude. Both the two revenue sharing contracts can coordinate this
supply chain with a risk-neutral retailer. They are not always able to coordinate the supply
chain with a risk-averse retailer. However, the supply chain with a risk-averse retailer can be
coordinated by executing any risk sharing contracts, which are based on any kind of revenue
sharing contracts.
After that, we have established the analytical relationships between the two revenue sharing
contracts.  (1)  If  the  retailer  is  risk-neutral,  any  kind  of  revenue  sharing  contracts  is  not
absolutely  better  than  another  for  each  member.  (2)  If  the  retailer  is  risk-averse,  her
downside-risk is  related to  her  profit  share in  the supply  chain with  any kind of  revenue
sharing contracts. For the whole supply chain, the efficiencies of  the two revenue sharing
contracts are different, which is related to the retailer’s profit share and the upper bound of the
retailer’s downside risk. For all the supply chain members, the efficiencies of the two revenue
sharing contracts are also different, which is related to the each member’s profit share, the
retailer’s target profit level, and the upper bound of the retailer’s downside-risk. (3) If the
retailer is risk-averse and the risk sharing contract is executed, for the whole supply chain and
the  retailer,  the  efficiencies  of  the  two  revenue  sharing  contracts  are  the  same;  for  the
distributor and the manufacturer, the efficiencies of the two revenue sharing contracts are
different,  except  when  ,  the  distributor’s  preference  between  the  two  revenue
sharing contracts are opposite to and the manufacturer’s.
In practice, which kind of revenue sharing contract is employed in the supply chain, depends on
the indicator of the supply chain decision-maker concerned, such as the profit of supply chain,
the profit of each member, the risk of the retailer faced. From the different perspective, the
comparative results between the two revenue sharing contracts are different. If the decision-
maker concerns total profit of the supply chain, any revenue-sharing contract can be used. If the
decision-maker is a member in the supply chain, she would like to execute a revenue-sharing
contract which gives her a higher profit, and this may be hurting the other members’ benefits.
Specially, if the retailer is risk-averse, the decision-maker should consider the risk of the retailer
faced expect the profit in the supply chain. So the best way is executing the risk-sharing contract
both to coordinate the supply chain and to satisfy the retailer’s risk constraint. Moreover, it is
also beneficial to the decision-maker that the comparative results of the two revenue sharing
contracts under the risk-sharing contract are intuitive (See Corollary 7). 
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In a nutshell, this study provides an accurate and comprehensive guide for the supply chain
decision-maker about how to coordinate the conflict of interest among the members. Future
research  can  incorporate  the  other  supply  chain  contracts,  such  as  buyback  contract,
sale-rebate contract, and option contract. 
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Based on the revenue sharing contract I with parameters  and ,
the target profit of the retailer is αR. So there is a critical order quantity QI0, which satisfies the
equality as follows, . It means that
Noting Equation (7a), we have
(A.1)
According to Equation (A.1), the downside-risk of the retailer is analyzed as follows.
(1) If Q≤QI0, then .
Therefore, .
(2) If Q>QI0, two situations are discussed. 
First, if Q>QI0 and X>Q, .
Therefore, .
Second, if Q>QI0 and X≤Q, . So
-1462-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1556
In summary, if Q>QI0,
(A.2)
It is obvious that the downside-risk of the retailer in Equation (A.2) increases with Q.
Hence, we have
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1.  We discuss the range of QI* in the supply chain with revenue sharing
contract I with  and .
First, according to Equation (16), the risk-averse retailer must make an order quantity such
that it is greater than QI0. Otherwise, her downside-risk constraint is one. So we have QI*>QI0.
Second, the retailer would not make an order quantity greater than QC, because her expected
profit is concave with respect to Q and the optimal solution is QC. So we have QI*≤QC.
Last, the target profit of the risk-averse retailer is equal to or less than  for the downside-risk
constraint. According to Equations (8a) and (15), we have
It means that QI0<QC.  Hence, the optimal order quantity of  the risk-averse retailer  satisfy
QI*  (QI0, QC].
This completes the proof.
Proof of  Proposition 3.  According to  Lemma 1,  because QI0<QC,  F(QI0)<F(γI) holds.  We
discuss the value of QI* from three cases as follows.
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If βR≤F(QI0), then
(A.3)
holds. Because of Equation (15), the inequality (A.3) is equivalent to Q≤QI0, which is opposite
to Q>QI0. So the problem (14) has no feasible solution if βR≤F(QI0).
If  F(QI0)<βR<F(γI),  the retailer  make an optimal  order quantity  for  the problem (14). The
optimal order quantity QI* satisfies
This is because the retailer’s expected profit increases with Q for QI0<Q≤QC and the retailer’s
downside-risk is also increases with Q for  QI0<Q. Hence, the optimal order quantity of the
retailer is
And if F(γI)≤βR, then
The order quantity QC not only maximizes the retailer’s expected profit but also satisfies the
retailer’s downside-risk constraint. Hence, the retailer’s optimal order quantity is QC in this
situation.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. According to Proposition 3, if F(γI)≤βR , QI*=QC Based on the definition of
the supply chain coordination given by Cachon (2003), the three-echelon supply chain can be
coordinated by the revenue sharing contract I with the wholesale prices ( , ). 
If F(QI0)<βR<F(γI),  . We have  QI*<QC because  βR<F(γI). In this case, the
retailer’s optimal order quantity cannot maximize the supply chain profit and the supply chain
cannot be coordinated by the revenue sharing contract I. 
If βR≤F(QI0), the retailer would not order any product. Hence, the supply chain also cannot be
coordinated by the revenue sharing contract I in this case.
This completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 4. In the supply chain governed by the revenue sharing contract I with
 and , we discuss the members’ expected profit from three cases as follows:
(1) if  F(γI)≤βR, the optimal order quantity of the risk-averse retailer is equal to that of the
risk-neutral  retailer,  i.e.,  QI*=QC.  It  means that  .  So according to  Equations
(1-3), (7a) and (7b), the optimal profits of the retailer, the distributor and the manufacturer
are also Equations (8a), (8b) and (8c), respectively.
(2) if F(QI0)<βR<F(γI), then QI*<QC. The total expected profit of the supply chain profit is less
than , i.e., , because the total expected profit of the supply chain increases
with Q for  QI0<Q≤QC.  So according to Equations (1), (2), (3), (7a) and (7b), the optimal
expected profits of the retailer, the distributor and the manufacturer become Equations (18a),
(18b) and (18c), respectively;
(3) if  βR≤F(QI0), according to Proposition 3, the retailer does not order a quantity and each
member’s expected profits are zero.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. Similar to the proof of Proposition 2, based on the revenue sharing
contract II with parameters  and  , there is a critical order quantity QII0, which satisfies 
Because , we have
(A.4)
According to Equation (A.4), the downside-risk of the retailer is analyzed as follows:
(1)  if  Q≤QII0,  then  
. Therefore, .
(2) if Q>QII0, two situation are discussed. First, if X>Q,  
.  Therefore,  .
Second,  if  X≤Q,  .  So  
In summary, if Q>QII0,
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(A.5)
It is obvious that the downside-risk of the retailer in Equation (A.5) increases with Q.
Hence we have
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we discuss the range of QII*.
First, according to Equation (20), the retailer must make an order quantity such that QII*>QII0,
otherwise her downside-risk is one.
Second, the retailer would not make an order quantity greater than QC because her expected
profit is concave with respect to Q and the optimal solution is QC. So we have QII*≤QC.
Last, for the retailer,   must be satisfied for the downside-risk constraint. According to
Equations (13a) and (19), we have
It means that  QII0<QC. Hence, the optimal order quantity of the risk-averse retailer satisfies
QII*  (QII0, QC].
This completes the proof.
Proof  of  Proposition  6.  Similar  to  the  proof  of  Proposition  3,  according  to  Lemma  2,
F(QII0)<F(γII) holds. We discuss the value of QII* from three cases.
If βR≤F(QII0), then
(A.6)
holds. Because of Equation (19), the inequality (A.6) is equivalent to Q≤QII0, which is opposite
to Q>QII0. So the problems (14) has no feasible solution if βR≤F(QII0).
If F(QII0)<βR<F(γII), the optimal order quantity of the risk-averse retailer QII* satisfies
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This is because the retailer’s expected profit increases with Q for QII0<Q≤QC and the retailer’s
downside-risk increases with Q for QII0<Q. Hence, the optimal order quantity of the retailer is
And if F(γII)≤βR, then
The order quantity QC not only maximizes the retailer’s expected profit but also satisfy the
retailer’s downside-risk constraint, so QII*=QC.
This completes the proof.
Proof  of  Theorem 2.  Similar  to  the  proof  of  Theorem 1,  according  to  Proposition  6,  if
F(γII)≤βR,  QII*=QC. Based on the definition of the supply chain coordination given by Cachon
(2003),  the supply  chain can be coordinated by the revenue  sharing contract  II  with  the
wholesale prices ( , ).
If F(QII0)<βR<F(γII), . Because βR<F(γII), we have QII*<QC. In this case,
the retailer’s optimal order quantity cannot maximize the supply chain profit, so the supply
chain cannot be coordinated by the revenue sharing contract II.
If  βR≤F(QII0), the retailer would not order any product. Hence, the supply chain cannot be
coordinated by the revenue sharing contract II in this case.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. In the three-echelon supply chain governed by the revenue sharing
contract II with  and , we discuss the members’ expected profit from three cases.
(1) if  F(γII)≤βR, QII*=QC. It means that . So according to Equations (9)-(12b),
the optimal profits of the retailer,  the distributor and the manufacturer are also Equations
(13a)-(13c), respectively.
(2) if F(QII0)<βR<F(γII), then QII*<QC.   is obtained because the total expected
profit of the supply chain increases with Q for QII0<Q≤QC. So according to Equations (9)-(12b),
the  optimal  expected  profits  of  the  retailer,  the  distributor  and  the  manufacturer  become
Equations (22a)-(22c), respectively;
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(3) if  βR≤F(QII0), according to Proposition 6, the retailer does not order a quantity. So all the
member’s expected profits are zero.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8
(1) According to Equations (16) and (20), because  and , it is obvious
that the retailer’s downside-risk increases with the order quantity Q both in the two revenue
sharing contracts if Q>QI0 and Q>QII0.
(2) According to Lemma 3 and Equations (15), (16), (19) and (20), we comparative analyze
the  retailer’s  downside  risk  from  three  cases.  If  ,  QI0=QII0 holds,  so
; if , QI0>QII0, we have
so ; and if , QI0<QII0, we have 
so . 
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 9
First, if , noting Equations (17) and (21), it is obviously that QI*=QII*.
Second, if , we have F(QI0)>F(QII0) and F(γI)>F(γII).
(1) If F(QII0)<βR≤F(QI0), the retailer’s optimal order quantity is zero in the revenue sharing
contract I and is  in the revenue sharing contract II. So we have QI*<QII*.
(2) If F(QI0)<βR<F(γII), the retailer’s optimal order quantity is   in the revenue
sharing  contract  I  and  is   in  the  revenue  sharing  contract  II.  Because
 implies
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we have QI*<QII*;
(3) If F(γII)≤βR<F(γI), the retailer’s optimal order quantity is   in the revenue
sharing contract I and is  QC in the revenue sharing contract II. Because  ,
QI*<QII* holds;
(4) If F(γI)≤βR , the retailer’s optimal order quantity is QC both in the revenue sharing contract
I and in the revenue sharing contract II. So QI*=QII* holds.
Third, if , F(QI0)<F(QII0) and F(γI)<F(γII).
(1) If F(QI0)<βR≤F(QII0), the retailer’s optimal order quantity is   in the revenue
sharing contract I, but it’s zero in the revenue sharing contract II. So we have QI*>QII*.
(2) If F(QII0)<βR<F(γI), the retailer’s optimal order quantity is   in the revenue
sharing  contract  I  and  is   in  the  revenue  sharing  contract  II.  Because
 implies
we have QI*>QII*;
(3) If F(γI)≤βR<F(γII), the retailer’s optimal order quantity is QC in the revenue sharing contract
I and is  in the revenue sharing contract II. Because ,
we have QI*>QII*;
(4) If F(γII)≤βR, no matter in the revenue sharing contract I or in the revenue sharing contract
II, the retailer’s optimal order quantity is QC . So QI*=QII* holds.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 10
First,  if  ,  we  have   because  QI*=QII*.  Moreover,  since
F(QI0)=F(QII0) and F(γI)=F(γII), we have the following discussion.
(1) If βR≤F(QI0), all the member’s profit is zero in the two revenue sharing contracts.
-1469-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1556
(2) If F(QI0)<βR<F(γI), the members’ optimal expected profit in the revenue sharing contract I
are Equations (18a)-(18c), and the member’s optimal expected profit in the revenue sharing
contract II are Equations (22a)-(22c). 
For the retailer, . 
For  the  distributor,   if  ,   if
, and  if .
For the manufacturer,   if  ,   if  ,
and  if .
(3)  If  F(γI)≤βR,  ,  ,   and
 hold because QI*=QII*=QC.
Second, if , since F(QI0)>F(QII0) and F(γI)>F(γII), we have the following discussion.
(1)  If  F(QII0)<βR≤F(QI0),  then   because  QI*<QII*.  Moreover,  all  the
member’s  optimal  expected  profits  in  the  revenue  sharing  contract  I  are  zero,  and  the
member’s optimal expected profit in the revenue sharing contract II are Equations (22a)-(22c).
Hence, ,  and .
(2) If F(QI0)<βR<F(γII), then  because QI*<QII*. Moreover, the member’s
optimal expected profit in the revenue sharing contract I are Equations (18a)-(18c), and the
member’s optimal expected profit in the revenue sharing contract II are Equations (22a)-(22c).
For the retailer, we have . 
For the distributor, if  , we have  , however, we could not
get a clear comparison between  and  if . 
For the manufacturer, if , we have , however, we could not get
a clear comparison between  and  if .
(3) If  F(γII)≤βR<F(γI),  then   because  QI*<QII*=QC.  Moreover,  the
member’s optimal expected profit in the revenue sharing contract I are Equations (18a)-(18c),
and the member’s optimal expected profit in the revenue sharing contract II are Equations
(13a)-(13c). Through a simple analyzing, the comparative results in this situation are the same
as the results in the situation of F(QI0)<βR<F(γII).
(4)  If  F(γI)≤βR,  ,   and   hold
because QI*=QII*=QC.
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Third, if , since F(QI0)<F(QII0) and F(γI)<F(γII), we have the following discussion.
(1) if F(QI0)<βR≤F(QII0), then  because QI*>QII*. Moreover, the member’s
optimal expected profits in the revenue sharing contract I are Equations (18a)-(18c), and all
the member’s optimal expected profits in the revenue sharing contract II are zero. Hence, we
have ,  and .
(2) if F(QII0)<βR<F(γI), then  because QI*>QII*. Moreover, the member’s
optimal expected profit in the revenue sharing contract I are Equations (18a)-(18c), and the
member’s optimal expected profit in the revenue sharing contract II are Equations (22a)-(22c).
For the retailer, we have . 
For the distributor, we have  if , however, we could not get
a clear comparison between  and  if . 
For the manufacturer, we have  if , however, we also could not
get a clear comparison between  and  if .
(3)  if  F(γI)≤βR<F(γII),  then   because  QC=QI*>QII*.  Moreover,  the
member’s optimal expected profit in the revenue sharing contract I are Equations (8a)-(8c),
and the member’s optimal expected profit in the revenue sharing contract II are Equations
(22a)-(22c). Through a simple analyzing, the comparative results in this situation are the same
as the results in the situation of F(QII0)<βR<F(γI).
(4)  if  F(γII)≤βR,  so  ,   and  
because QI*>QII*=QC.
According to the above discussion, we can draw the comparative results about the members’
optimal expected profit.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 11. To ensure that the retailer’s downside-risk constraint is met when
QI*<Q≤QC according to Equation (25), we have . 
If the retailer orders a quantity Q such that QI*<Q≤QC, then the expected profits of the retailer,
the distributor and the manufacturer change by the amount
(A.7a)
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(A.7b)
and
(A.7c)
respectively. To encourage all the members to participate into the risk sharing contract I, the
value of   (i=R, D, M) must be equal to or greater than zero. According to Equation
(A.7a),   holds because p>CR + CD + CM and  QI*<Q. According to Equation (A.7b),
 means that
(A.8)
According to Equation (A.7c),  means that
(A.9)
According to Equations (23b) and (A.8), the lower bound of  is
According to Equations (23b) and (A.9), the upper bound of  is
This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. We prove that three conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied.
(1) According to Proposition 12, all the members get an expected profit more than themselves
reservation profit when QI*<Q≤QC;
(2) If Equation (25) is set up, the retailer’s downside-risk constraint is met when QI*<Q≤QC;
(3) From Equation (26a), the expected profit of the retailer increases with Q for QI*<Q≤QC. In
addition, the retailer’s ordering a quantity exceeding QC violates her downside-risk constraint,
since the contract specifies the maximum return quantity as (QC–QI*). Therefore, the retailer
would order QC which maximizes her expected profit subject to her downside-risk constraint.
Thus the supply chain’s profit is maximized.
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According to Definition1, the supply chain is coordinated.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 12. Similar to the proof of Proposition 11, to ensure that the retailer’s
downside-risk  constraint  is  met  when  QII*<Q≤QC,  according  to  Equation  (30),  we  have
.
If  the  retailer  orders  a quantity  Q such that  QII*<Q≤QC,  then the expected profits  of  the
retailer, the distributor and the manufacturer change by the amount
(A.10a)
(A.10b)
and
(A.10c)
respectively. To encourage all  the members to participate into the risk sharing contract II,
 must be satisfied (i=R, D, M). According to Equation (A.10a),   holds
because p>CR + CD + CM and Q>QII*. According to Equation (A.10b),  means that
(A.11)
According to Equation (A.10c),  means that
(A.12)
According to Equations (28b) and (A.11), the lower bound of  is
According to Equations (28b) and (A.12) the upper bound of  is
This completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 4. We prove that three conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied.
(1) According to Proposition 9, all the members get an expected profit more than themselves
reservation profit when QII*<Q≤QC;
(2) If Equation (30) is set up, the retailer’s downside-risk constraint is met when QII*<Q≤QC;
(3) From Equation (31a), the expected profit of the retailer increases with Q for QII*<Q≤QC . In
addition, the retailer’s ordering a quantity exceeding QC violates her downside-risk constraint,
since the contract specifies the maximum return quantity as (QC–QII*). Therefore, the retailer
would order QC which maximizes her expected profit subject to her downside-risk constraint.
Thus, the supply chain’s profit is maximized.
According to Definition 1, the supply chain is coordinated. 
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 13.  Under the condition of   and  , we have  
holds.  According  to  Equations  (27a)  and  (32a),  if  ,  the  retailer  has  the  same
expected profit in the two risk sharing contracts. 
Moreover, if  , for the distributor, according to Equations (27b) and (32b), 
holds  when  ,   holds  when   and   holds  when
; for the manufacturer, according to Equations (27c) and (32c),   holds
when ,   holds when   and   holds when  . Therefore,
we have the comparative results shown in Table 5. 
This completes the proof.
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